



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN POLITY. By Henry Sidgwick. London: Macmillan & Co., 1903, pp. xxvi, 454.

This book makes the third of the posthumous works of the late Professor Sidgwick, and of the three it is perhaps the most considerable. It has had the advantage of being most ably edited by his widow, and although in the matter of arrangement much seems to have been left to the editorial discretion, there can be few to whom the present book will not appear to do the utmost justice to the methodical and analytic thinking of the author. The experiment, it must be said, was at the best a trifle dangerous. To write so very serious a sketch of the political development of Greece and Rome and modern Western Europe, and to do so in the midst of constant application to other subjects in which a wide influence and a very rare distinction had been won, to give it to a public—from the nature of the subject more than usually mixed—who could not possibly be persuaded but that here it would of necessity find Cambridge history, in the broad sense, at its best,—this was, for one who was not a professional historian, confessed and marked by an innocence of speculative thought, to give many hostages to fortune. But for the fact that the attempt was first made in the form of lectures, and that Sidgwick never “stereotyped” his lectures, one might be inclined to doubt whether it would have been carried through. It is therefore with a peculiar interest that one reads Mrs. Sidgwick’s explanation in the preface, that it had of late years been the author’s view that a threefold treatment of politics is desirable for completeness, “first, an exposition analytical and deductive, such as he attempted in his work on the ‘Elements of Politics’; secondly, an evolutionary study of the development of polity within the historic period in Europe . . . ; thirdly, a comparative study of the constitutions of Europe and its colonies in connection with the history of what may be called the constitution-making century which has just ended.” And if the second of these three tasks seems too stupendous for the mere student of what is called Political Philosophy, the work before us is not the only reminder of the sterling and unexampled thoroughness of the late author. “With regard to the third point of view . . .

it was a favorite idea of his, when he was making plans for the future, that he might reside abroad for some time in different countries successively, in order to learn on the spot not only what their constitutions were on paper, but what they were in fact—how they actually worked and what tendencies to development were operating. The scheme was perhaps too ambitious to have had, at Mr. Sidgwick's age, much chance of being carried out by him, but it is a scheme which, if adequately performed, ought to afford much interest and instruction." A critic of the work before us might well sum up with just such a reflection. It also, though in another way, is "perhaps too ambitious." As regards "an evolutionary study of the development of polity within the historic period in Europe, beginning with the earliest known Græco-Roman and Teutonic polity, and carried down to the modern state of Europe and its colonies as the last result of political evolution," there can, of course, be no talk of adequacy. But anyone who knows how broad and general are the only results yielded by Inductive Politics, how attractive and how popular are the generalisations which Freeman and Maine and Seeley have made current, how much in need of new analysis, how likely to be overlaid by reservations or to go to waste without them, may well consider that the substantial purpose of the book has been achieved. It is sometimes formal rather than "morphological" and cramped as well as severe. History on the large scale has not usually been quite so unrelenting. It might have been more viewy and no less true. But within the limits of its purpose and of its binding it is still Sidgwick at his best, the familiar analysis, the accustomed caution, the old, untiring effort of intellectual honesty dæmonically sustained. These things have not yet become a fetish in Political Philosophy. If ever they become so, then perhaps, if it was no bad criticism of Arnold upon Shakspeare that the sonnet was "almost adequate," it may be thought no bad criticism of Sidgwick on the development of polity that he was "perhaps too ambitious."

Meanwhile, one of the most conspicuous features of the book is its utility. A book has for some time been greatly needed which should bring together in a balanced and corrected form what the student has had to extract piecemeal out of the well-known works of Freeman or Seeley or Maine, out of histories written with no view to broad comparisons, and out of special essays in comparative politics such as those by Mr. Warde

Fowler and Mr. Jenks. The relation between political history and political theory is, moreover, not forgotten. The value of such a survey as Professor Sidgwick attempted is specially enhanced by the fact that he expended much industry in placing the conclusions of previous writers not only in their most considered form, but also in the light of their mutual corrections, as well as of his own criticism. To illustrate this may bring out some important features of the book.

First, then, and as regards the starting point, we have a careful criticism of the way in which Freeman represents the earliest data of comparative politics—the “primitive Indo-Germanic polity” consisting of a king, a council, and an assembly. It is pointed out that affinities of language are a very imperfect guide to affinities of race, and that in speaking of an Indo-Germanic family of nations it is not implied that they are all derived from one stock, but only that they are connected with one ancient social group by a continuous social life evidenced by continuity of language and at least partly due to continuity of race. In Sidgwick’s view, the polity of which Freeman speaks is not to be regarded as in any way peculiar to the Aryan race. Moreover, it is not primitive. The account of Tacitus does, that of Cæsar does not, show us the institution of kingship among the German tribes. Our earliest data show us here a movement *towards* kingship, and in any case the supreme authority appears to reside in an assembly of free warriors. The threefold institution would, therefore, seem *not* to be an “inheritance from the time when Greeks, Romans, and Teutons lived together.”

As regards the Patriarchal Theory, it is not unnatural that this part of the work should take the form of a criticism of Maine. Readers of Morgan and McLennan must often have desired such a critical summary as is here given. Morgan’s work, in many respects one of the most important books ever written in English on primitive society, suffers so badly from his peculiar use of the term “gens” that it can hardly be utilised to bring Maine’s theories to the test of fact. McLennan’s well-directed learning has much more unmistakable results. The facts of polyandry and the tracing of kinship through females are regarded in the later form of Maine’s conclusions as aberrations, though possibly frequent aberrations, from the larger course of development. In truth, they tell much more heavily against the Patriarchal Theory than Maine admits. Sidgwick does not regard it as even

decidedly most probable that any political society which we know historically was actually developed by the expansion of a single family. Not only is the "Cyclopean" family, based on sexual jealousy and physical force, very different from the Patriarchal, with its oldest living male ascendant bearing despotic sway, but there is no reason to suppose that the latter developed immediately out of the former, and the former may well not be primitive. Even where the Patriarchal family becomes established and has developed into the clan, the idea of "son representing father" hardly accounts for hereditary chieftainship.

Two other criticisms of "Ancient Law" may be added. The first has reference to Maine's account of Rousseau. Sidgwick shows that it adds quite a new paradox to the *Contrat Social* to suggest that for Rousseau the perfect social order could be and must be evolved from a consideration of the original or savage state. Admirer of the "noble savage" Rousseau certainly was, but he did not regard *droit naturel* as realised in the original state of man. He does not endow "original man" with the passions and conflict of an intolerable and exaggerated Civil War, making life "nasty, brutish, and short," but he is at one with Hobbes in holding that in this state man has no notion of *jus* or *droit* at all. "The original state of nature, though it is, if not perhaps the happiest, at any rate the freest from inequality, is certainly not a state in which *jus naturæ* is realised."

Again, Maine regards Montesquieu's influence as opposed to and overborne by Rousseau's. Sidgwick sides with Janet in holding that the "*Esprit des Lois*" may be classed with the "*Contrat Social*" as forming part of the literary source and spring of the Revolution. The doctrine of the relativity of forms of government does not do any very vigorous battle against republicanism. The principle of a republic, for Montesquieu, is political virtue; and this idea "may be called the main historical element of French Revolutionary thought; and perhaps it did as much even as the idea of natural liberty and equality and the idea of the inalienable and indivisible sovereignty of the people to rouse the fire of revolutionary ardour."

Generalisations are indeed part of the author's program. Examples are: a comparison of the parts played by monarchical despotism in Greece and Rome (p. 65); by town and country in ancient and modern Europe (p. 67); the influence of religion on the history of the Greek city-states (p. 219); the "most general

statement" of the type of political organisation in the feudal period (p. 213).

GEORGE CLAUS RANKIN.

LONDON.

MORALS: A TREATISE ON THE PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGICAL BASES OF ETHICS. By Professor G. L. Duprat. Translated by W. J. Greenstreet, M. A., F. R. A. S. London: The Walter Scott Publishing Co., Ltd., 1903, pp. xv, 382.

This is by no means a striking or remarkable book, but it is very sensible, and both interesting and suggestive, and not least so as illustrating some of the perplexities of ethical thought at the present day.

It is to be regretted that the translation is not more satisfactory. A long list of passages—awkwardly rendered or wrongly rendered—might be drawn up, and also many cases of carelessness in statement of references in the footnotes might be noticed. Our limits, however, will only permit of a general indication of Professor Duprat's main problem, and of the principles underlying his attempted solution.

Stated briefly, his problem is as follows: What can guarantee stability in Morals? The ideas of good and evil, of justice and injustice, of what is lawful and what is forbidden, seem more and more to be granted a merely conventional or even provisional worth; and the "social conscience," the moral ideas and sentiments of the community as such, seem to be in a state of hesitation, wavering, and uncertainty. Religion and Philosophy are powerless to afford to the age the moral stability which it needs. Substitutes like Utilitarianism and the Religion of Humanity have been proved failures.

In the main, these statements may be accepted. The failure of what has been called, in the English-speaking world, "Moral Philosophy" is almost impressive. And in the interesting but singularly ineffective development of "Idealism" in the last quarter of the nineteenth century we have a mode of thought whose accredited exponents usually define "Ethical Theory" in such a way as to make it devoid of all practical significance.*

* This is implied in the constant contention that it is not the business of Ethical Theory to lay down *any* "rule of conduct." Professor Bosanquet goes so far as to stigmatise as "Casuistry" any attempt to derive guiding principles from "Ethical Science."